As Alberta voters weigh their choices ahead of the Oct. 19 referendum, they face a central unanswered question: what would greater provincial control over immigration and settlement actually look like in practice? A Quebec-like model appears to be the province’s goal, but experts say it is far from clear what additional powers Alberta would seek, how they would be implemented and whether they might require constitutional amendments.
In a written response to a New Canadian Media inquiry, Elections Alberta said the questions in the referendum are non-binding and “do not impose a legal obligation” on the Alberta government to act. It added that it cannot interpret the questions or explain what their results would mean.
In a separate written response, the Alberta Premier’s office said: “The details of new legislation to implement the will of Albertans as expressed in the referendum will be decided by the legislature thereafter.”
The practical question, then, is how much more authority Alberta could seek and how much control it already has.
Through the Alberta Advantage Immigration Program (AAIP), the province already has a role in economic immigration. The program allows Alberta to nominate eligible candidates for permanent residence through provincial immigration streams.
Quebec provides the clearest Canadian precedent for a broader provincial role in immigration, a model the Alberta government itself has pointed to. Under the Canada – Quebec Accord, Quebec selects economic immigrants and has greater control in setting its immigration levels, while Ottawa retains responsibility for the final act of admission.
In a 2024 letter to then prime minister Justin Trudeau, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith called for greater involvement of her province in the “selection and settlement of immigrants similar to that available to Quebec.” She added that, if Ottawa did not respond to the province’s requests, Alberta would “assess areas where [it] can push for a larger role in immigration and settlement services.” In the 2024 letter, Smith wrote that the province’s push for greater involvement in immigration policy and planning was “clearly consistent” with the Constitution Act, 1867, which states that provincial legislatures may make laws in relation to “immigration into the province.”
The Quebec model
Yamena Ansari, a Calgary-based immigration lawyer, and Marco Navarro-Genie, president of the Haultain Research Institute in Alberta, recommend the Quebec example in discussing what Alberta might seek, although they emphasize different aspects of the model.
Ansari describes the existing arrangement in Alberta as “shared jurisdiction,” but says Ottawa controls most of the immigration system, including national immigration levels and most temporary-resident programs. Alberta’s primary role is through its Provincial Nominee Program, the AAIP, which allows the province to influence who is selected for “a portion of economic immigration destined for Alberta.”
The AAIP illustrates the division of responsibilities. Ottawa determines how many nominations Alberta can issue, while the province decides which candidates to prioritize. In 2026, Alberta’s allocation is 6,603 nominations, with the AAIP prioritizing worker nominations in key sectors including healthcare, technology, construction, manufacturing, aviation and agriculture, as well as communities designated under the Rural Renewal Stream.
That gives Alberta a meaningful role in selecting economic immigrants, Ansari says, but not control over immigration levels generally. A provincial nomination is not also a decision on permanent residence: nominees must go through the federal process, with Ottawa retaining responsibility for the final selection and determining admissibility.
The referendum question proposes increased provincial control over immigration to reduce immigration to “more sustainable levels,” prioritize economic migration and give Albertans first priority for new employment opportunities. The question does not specify a new immigration target, identify which new federal programs Alberta would seek to control or set out a new provincial selection system.
Ansari argues that a Quebec-style arrangement would be a more realistic route to greater provincial control than attempting to rewrite the constitutional division of powers. She says Alberta could make greater use of the power it already has through its provincial immigration program, but exercising a role similar to Quebec would require federal cooperation.
A mandate to negotiate
Navarro-Genie argues that immigration is a concurrent constitutional jurisdiction under Section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867, meaning Alberta already has constitutional authority to legislate on immigration into the province, although federal law prevails where the two conflict.
He puts the political significance somewhat differently, pointing to Quebec’s agreement with Ottawa as a precedent for greater provincial authority.
“A yes vote on any of the 10 questions does not automatically transfer jurisdiction to Alberta,” he said. “What it creates is a mandate” which carries “more weight than critics allow and less than enthusiasts hope.” The referendum itself would not move power from Ottawa to Edmonton, but a strong vote could give the government a mandate to seek greater authority from Ottawa.
That mandate would not remove the practical and constitutional limits on Alberta’s authority. Mobility rights, for example, Ansari says, mean Alberta could not require permanent residents that it nominated to remain in the province, nor prevent permanent residents selected elsewhere from moving to Alberta.
The employment language in Question 1 presents an additional limit because it asks about giving Albertans “first priority on new employment opportunities” without defining what that would mean for employers or Canadian citizens or permanent residents who live elsewhere in the country.
Ansari and Navarro-Genie say there are limits to how far an “Albertan first” policy could go, given the mobility and equality rights of Canadians and permanent residents from elsewhere in the country.
Constitutional questions
Sharry Aiken, a Queen’s University law professor and immigration law scholar whose research and teaching focus on public and constitutional law and their intersection with immigration, explains the constitutional limits on how far Alberta could expand its role.
Prof. Aiken agrees that the Constitution does give provinces legislative authority in relation to immigration. But that authority exists concurrently with federal jurisdiction. She points to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2001 decision in Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat as a key authority for the ‘paramountcy’ doctrine. The ruling established that where valid federal and provincial laws conflict in an area of concurrent jurisdiction, federal paramountcy means the provincial law is inoperative to the extent of the conflict. A referendum, she says, cannot change that constitutional division of powers.
“The realistic post-referendum endpoint for Alberta is not…Alberta is going to control all immigration into Alberta,” the law professor said. Rather, she said, it would be “a negotiated expansion of provincial influence in a system where Ottawa remains the final constitutional authority.”
As Navarro-Genie puts it: “Nothing changes on October 20; nothing is verily settled, except the strength of the instruction.”
Aloa Alota
Aloa Alota is a recipient of the 2025 Press Freedom Hero Award from the Gambia Press
Union. He is author (with Demba Ali Jawo) of A Living Mirror: The Life of Deyda
Hydara, which examines journalism, power, and risk through the life of the slain
Gambian journalist - Deyda Hydara. The work has been endorsed by Reporters Without
Borders (RSF) and adopted by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) as
an advocacy text on freedom of expression in Africa. He holds a PhD in Media Studies
from Western University, London, Ontario.
